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ARIZONA'S EXPERIENCE WITH
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
By N.D. HOUGHTON*
ARIZONA's constitution was drafted in 1910~ preparatory
~to admission of the territory into the union as a state,

in 1912. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, in that era of
advocacy of increased popular control in government, that
the initiative, the referendum, the recall, the direct primary,
and woman suffrage should have got some attention in Arizona. And there were in territorial Arizona specific local
conditions which operated to give these processes strong
appeal for alert public welfare-minded persons.
lt was generally understood that during the two de-cades
prior to statehood the territorial government was rather
effectively controlled by, or in the interest of, railroad and
-· mining corporations. The legislative performance record
indicated that these corporate interests had a high batting
average in securing enactment of territorial laws and in
preventing enactment of labor-sponsored measures and
others not desired by mining and railroad management. 1
The historian McClintock records the bold assertion that a
veto by the territorial governor could be assured for $2000. 2
Naturally, alert men from the ranks of workers, farmers,_
and small business were dissatisfied and desirous of breaking this alleged corporation dominance. The then currently_new direct popular control processes seemed to be promising
devices for counteracting corporate influence, if they could
be adopted in Arizona.
It appears that the initiative and referendum were first
brought to public attention in Arizona by an unsuccessful
Populist candidate for territorial delegate to Congress in
• Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona.
1. See V. D. Brannon, Employers' Liability and Workmen's Co-mpensation in Arizona, Social Science Bulletin No. 7, University of Arizona, 1934, pp. 11, 12. See also
Judson King, "The Arizona Story in a Nutshell," Equity Series, Vol. XIV, p. 7, 1912.
2. See J. H. McClintock, Arizona, Vol. II, pp. 345, 356, cited by Brannon, op. cit.
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1894. The piatform of the territorial Republican Party in
1898 advocated the principles of the initiative and referendum applicable to measures ,creating public debt, apparently having in mind particularly the referendum. 4 This
declaration did not connote any real Arizona Republican
liberalism, however, and in the legislative experiences of the
period Republicans generally were reported as voting acceptably to the corporations; such support as labor was able
to get came mostly from Democrats.
In the legislative session of 1899, controlled by Democrats, a bill establishing a system of initiative and referendum was passed, 5 but was pocket-vetoed by the-Republican
territorial governor, 6 and no further legislative consideration was given to the matter till 1909. In that year, a laborsponsored bill to adopt the initiative and the refere:qdum
was able to get through only one house of a heavily Democratic legislature. 1
In the decade prior to 1910, unionization of workers in
Arizona Territory made considerable progress. In the local
aspects of the statehood controversy, mine and railroad management were understood to be unenthusiastic about statehood. They felt satisfied with the existing governmental situation, feared higher taxes, and the mines particularly
feared what are now called severance taxes. Labor spokesmen favored statehood, hoping to be in a stronger position
with a new locally-based state governmental organization. 8
3. Mr. W. 0. O'Neill, former editor of Hoof and Horn, ·a weekly organ of the
Territorial Livestock Association. See Prescott Weekly Courier, October 12, 1894. See
Charles F. Todd, The Initiative and Referendum in Arizona, unpublished thesis in the
University of Arizona Library, 1931. This is an excellent study of developments down
to 1930.
4. Arizona Sentinel, September 24, 1898.
5. Journals of Twentieth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona,
pp. 363, 367, 377.
6. Governor N. 0. Murphy, reputed to have been very friendly with mines and
railroads. Todd, op. cit., p. 9.
7. Journals of Twenty-fifth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona,
pp. 247-48; Arizona Gazette, March 19, 1909.
8. See Brannon, op. cit., p. 15, and Katheryne Elizabeth Baugh, Arizona's Struggle
for Statehood: unpublished thesis in the University of Missouri Library, 1934. See also
Howard A. Hubbard, "The Arizona Enabling Act and President Taft's Veto," Pacifi•
Historical Review, Vol. III, p. 307 (September 1934).
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Statehood was also favored by farmers and small business
generally.
When Congress finally passed the Arizona Enabling Act
in 1910, local labor leaders recognized that the time was ripe
for labor, with such other support as might be found, to lay
a foundation for a more effective voice in government. As a
local union resolution put the matter, "The working class, if
it only utilizes it, has the power to make this constitution
to its own liking, and if it is properly drafted, our economic
struggles of the future will be greatly simplified and our opportunities of bettering our conditions rendered. much
easier." 9 The common people of Arizona seemed really to
need the initiative and the referendum forty years ago.
In the struggle to get control of the convention, which
was to draft a constitution for the proposed new state, labor
and liberal forces teamed up with Democratic Party leaders;
the Republicans being alleged to be more friendly to the corporations. In that campaign for the election of delegates, the
principal contest was on the issue of whether the proposed
constitution should embody the initiative, the referendum,
and the recall. Alert labor men wanted particularly to get a
plan for direct legislation written into the constitution because of their unhappy legislative experiences in the prestate era. They had no illusions about being able to control
the new state legislature; but, because of their voting
strength, they hoped to be able, by the initiative process, to
enact laws directly which they would not be able to get by
the regular legislative process. They also hoped to be able,
by use of the referendum, to prevent enactment of laws
which they might not be able to defeat in the legislature. 10
The corporations feared that working people might possibly
make good on this threat to use these direct legislative devices, and opposed their adoption with great vigor.
Labor had active support in its fight for direct legislation
9. Resolution passed by Bisbee Miners' Union, calling for a state-wide !abor conference to make plans for electing pro-labor delegates to the convention which was to
draft a constitution. Arizona Daily Star, July 8, 1910.'
10. See Tru McGinnis, The Inj!uence of Organized Labor on the Making of the
Arizona Constitution, unpublished thesis in the University of Arizona Library, 1930.
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from two other sources. Advocates of suffrage for women,
being unable to get the right to vote by legislative action,
threw their support to the effort to get direct legislative
processes into the constitution. Similarly, the prohibitionists supported the effort. 11
'
Election returns showed that of the 52 convention delegates elected, 41 were Democrats, of whom most were
avowedly friendly to labor and. committed to adoption of
the initiative, referendum, and recallP The convention
chose as chairman G. W. P. Hunt, prominent labor man,
member of the territorial legislature, and first and longtime governor of the new state. Those committees having
charge of matters of particular interest to labor were loaded
with men considered friendly to labor and its program.
In the convention, opponents of direct legislation continued to fight, seeking to set the required numbers of signatures to petitions high enough, they said, to discourage
too frequent use; so high, charged labor delegates, as to
render impractical the operation of its processes. As finally
adopted, signatures required for use of the state-wide initiative were set at 10 per cent for statutory measures and 15
per cent for constitutional amendments. For the referendum, the requirement is 5 per cent. These fixed percentages are of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor
in the last preceding general election.l 3 Any legislative
enactments carrying an emergency clause, and passed by a ·
two-thirds vote of all members of both houses, are exempt
11. Todd, op. cit., pp. 17, 18. These elements appear also to have worked together
to put over direct legislation plans elsewhere in that period. For example, see N. D.
Houghton, "The Initiative and Referendum in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review,
Vol. XIX, PP. 268-300 (January 1925).
12. ·one of the most prominent of the Democrats, Mr. E. E. Ellinwood, was an
attorney for one of the copper companies and was considered to be openly a spokesman
for that point of view.
.
13. Art. IV, Part 1, and Art. XXI. All petitions for state use must be filed with
the Secretary of State. Initiative petitions must be filed at least four months prior to
the election at which the measures are to be submitted to popular vote. Referendum
petitions must be filed within ninety days after the close of the legislative ·session at
which the measures are enacted, during which period operation of all enactments to
which the referendum is applicable, is automatically suspended. For local city, town,
and county purposes, signature requirements are 15 per cent for the initiative and 10
per cent for the referendum.
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from operation of the referendum.l In actual P!actice,
essentially every law enacted by the Arizona legislature
carries an emergency clause, if its sponsors can muster the
necessary votes, by deliberate design, to avoid any possibility of its being subjected to ~he referendum process.
Measures initiated or referred by petition to a vote of
the people are submitted at regular general elections only.l 5 ·
The Secretary of State is required by law to prepare and
make available to the voters for their information on such
measures a Publicity Pamphlet containing their full texts,
titles, and forms in which they are to appear on the ballot,
and. carrying also such limited-length arguments for and
against any measures as sponsors or opponents may care
to submit and pay for. 16 In order to become effective, any
measure submitted to popular vote must receive an affirmative majority of all votes cast upon it.17
Simple tabulation reveals that, in the forty-year period
from 1912 to 1952, a total of 133 measures 18 were submitted
to the people of Arizona by these processes :
4

14. Measures necessary "to preserve • the public peace, health, or safety, or to
provide appropriations for the support and maintenance of the Departments of State
and of State Institutions., may be declared "emergency measures" by the legislature.
15. The legislature may, at its own discretion, refer any enactment to a popular
vote, making its adoption contingent upon popular approval, and must so refer all
legislative proposals of constitutional amendments. The former may be referred at
general elections only, but the latter may be referred at either general, primary, or
special elections, as designated by the legislature. For decisions holding invalid referendum measures approved at special elections, see Estes v. State, 48 Ariz. 21; 68 Pac. 2d
753 (1936); Hudson v. Cummard, · 44 Ariz. 7; 33 Pac. 2d 591 (1934); Tucson Manor,
Ine. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., 73 Ariz. 387; 241 Pac. 2d 1126 ( 1952h
16. 60-107, Ch. 60, Art 1, Arizona Code Annotated, 1939.
17. All statutory enactments by the legislature are subject to the governor's veto
at time of enactment. In ordE!r to override a veto of an acf carrying an emergency
clause, and passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses, the legislature must repass it
by a three-fourths vote in both houses. These majorities are of members, not merely
of those present.
·
18. In addition, the legislature submitted 48 proposals to amend the constitution,
making a grand total of 181 measures upon which the people of Arizona were called
upon to vote in 22 elections over a period of 40 years. (At a special election, held in
conjunction with the primary election in 1950, only legislative proposals of constitutional amendments were submitted.) Of the 48 legislative proposals for amending the
constitution, 21 were adopted and 27 were disapproved. Out of a grand total of 181
propositions of all kinds submitted to the voters in 'that 40 year period, 73 were approved and 108 were. rejected.
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38 initiated proposals to amend the Constitution
13 adopted
25 lost
58 initiated statutory measures
18 adopted
40 lost
26 measures by referendum petition
14 approve5f
12 rejected
11 measures referred by legislature
7 approved
4 rejected
Professorial search for startling or even significant
"trends" in these over-all statistical data may be disappointing. As might have been expected, the proverbial "new
broom" was used rather freely in its early years. In the first
four consecutive elections, 15 constitutional amendments
were proposed by initiative petitions; that was approximately one-third of all such proposals for the forty year
period, which saw 24 such elections. In the first five consecutive elections, 24 statutory measures were proposed by
initiative petition, that being approximately 40 per cent of
all that type of proposals for the forty year period. Those
same first five consecutive elections saw the referendum by
petition applied to 15 legislative enactments; that was about
55 per cent of all use of this device for the forty year period.
The first half of this period saw all the devices of direct
legislation used 81 tiines, while the second twenty year
period saw them used only 52 times, the referendum being
applied only 11 times, as compared with 26 applications of
it in the previous twenty year period.
All this is not meant to imply, however, that these devices
are dying for lack of use or popular interest, as may be seen
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TABULATION SHO.WING NUMBERS OF ALL KINDS OF
MEASURES SUBMITTED TO ARIZONA VOTERS
FROM 1912 TO 1952, INCLUSIVE

By the Initiative
Year Amendments Statutes
1912
1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1930
1932
1933
1934
1936
1938
1940
1942
1944
1946
1948
1950
1952
Totals

1
5
5
4
0
-- 2
1
0
1
0
1
2
5
0
0
0
2
4
0
1
1
0
3
0
38

Amendments
Referendum
Proposed
By
By Legisby the
Petition
lature Legislature

0
10
5,
3
6
1
3
0
2
0
3
0
3
0
2
0
1
3
1
0
1
4
9
1

8
4
0
2
1
0
1
0
1
0
4
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
4

4
0
2
0
2
8
1
1
0
2
1
4
0
6
0
0
0
2.
0
0
4
3
7
1

58

26

11

48

from simple graphical representation. In fact, in only one
previous year had more petitioned measures been on the
Arizona ballot than in 1950 ;19 and recent years have shown
In 1914, there were 19 propositions on the ballot by petition. In 1950, the
number was 12; but there were also referred to the people in 1950 by
the legislature seven additional proposals to amend the state constitution.
19.

correspondi~g
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a sustained high voting performance on these propositions,
both numerically and proportionally.
Whether or not the processes of direct .legislation may be
said to have been "successful" in Arizona depends partly
upon definition, partly upon the extent to which groups
who have made use of the devices have been able to attain
their objectives, and partly upon the subjective attitudes
of interested persons at particular times. The initiative •
was designed as a positive device for the enactment of law.
The referendum by petition was, designed as a negative
device, frankly for the prevention of lawmaking. Groups
which have made use of the initiative in Arizona have
secured enactment of their measures in approximately onetpird of their attempts; while groups which have resorted
to referendum by petition in efforts to defeat the enactment
of statutes have managed to defeat 46 per cent of the measures attacked. Measured by achievements through regular
legislative processes, these results may seem impressive,
particularly when it is realized. that presumably these
groups have been unable to secure (or defeat) the enactment
of any of these laws in the legislature. In fact, the apparent
"successes" of these devices seem largely to· account for a
recurrent spotty demand for their abandonment or drastic
restriction. On the other hand, expensive unsuccessful
efforts to gain their objectives by these devices have naturally been disappointing to some groups on occasion.
Voters' responses to the challenges presented by these
legislative measures on the ballot may be shown by a simple
chart, statistically speaking. But any such presentation
· must necessarily be highly superficial. Any inclination to
draw significant conclusions from them would probably be
unwarranted. The number of petitioned measures appearing on the ballot has ranged from one to nineteen, 20 per
election. The proportion of voters voting at the el~ctions,
20. The official election returns on ail measures from 1912 to 1948 may be found
in two compilations made by the Arizona Secretary of State in 1930 and 1949. Yearly
records are available at the same office.
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who have voted on the measures, has ranged from 28 per
cent in 1936 to 83.2 per cent in 1946.21
Brief spedal mention should be made of the experience
record of the three readily identifiable groups who joh:ted
in sponsoring the fight for adoption of the initiative and
referendum in Arizona in the 1910-1912 era, labor, suffragists, and prohibitionists. All three groups met immediate
successes with these new devices in the early years of their
operation. Woman suffrage was adopted by the initiative
process at the new state's very first election in 1912. A
prohibition amendment was adopted by the· initiative in
1914, and strengthened by another in 1916; but they were
both repealed by initiative in 1932.
The first experience organized labor had with the actual
operation of direct legislation in Arizona found labor on
the defensive side of the referendum. Labor came out of its
active participation in the framing of the constitution with
new vigor, prestige, confidence, and accepted leadership. In
1912, at the peak of its new and brief position of power and
assertiveness, labor was able to secure passage by the
legislature of a series of laws, in the face of traditional
opposition from mining and railroad sources. Seven of
these laws were held up by referendum petitions. Labor
managed to get them all approved by the voters, but it got
an early demonstration of the fact that wealthy elements,
with ample means to pay the costs, could use the new
devices at least as advantageously as labor.
In 19H, six initiated measures, sponsored or supported
by the Arizona Federation of Labor, were adopted at the
21. Stated percentages are composite averages for all measures on the ballot at
each ·election :
1912-81.5
1928-47.3
1942-52
1914-68.7
1930-53.3
1944--72.3
1916-66.6
1932-73.4
1946-83.2
1918-53.6
1933- (Special Election)
1948-71
1920-58.7
1934-48.6
1950-80
1922-58.1
*1936-28
1952-67.4
1924-67.4
1938-54
1926-62.4
1940-65.1
• In 1936, only one measure was on the ballot.
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polls, though by yery narrow margins in some cases. Retrospectively, it can be seen that the going was getting harder
for labor. And in 1916, not only did it fail to secure adoption of the two measures which it sponsored by the initiative,22 but it also had to fight desperately to defeat two
amendments, initiated with alleged corporation support, and
apparently designed virtually to emasculate both the newlywon workmen's compensation system23 and the direct legislation system itself. 24 That ended labor's honeymoon with
direct legislative processes in Arizona. Only rarely thereafter has labor resorted to them by deliberate design.
On two later occasions, in 1918 and in 1932, labor had
to defeqd its workmen's compensation system against determined attempts to weaken it at the polls. In 1946, in the
wake of postwar reaction, an anti-union, so-called "Right
to Work" Amendment was adopted, in spite of labor's best
efforts to prevent it. In 1948 labor was also unable to defeat
an initiated statutory measure effectuating this amendment.
In 1950, all six measures initiated with labor backing were
defeated. 25 And in 1952, labor was unable to prevent the
overwhelming adoption by the initiative process of a socalled "Fair Labor Practices Act," prohibiting "secondary
22. One was an amendment designed to establish a unicameral legislature. See
N. D. Houghton. "Arizona's Adventure with Unicameralism-an Anti-Climax,". 11
University of Kansas City Law Review 38 (December, 1940).
23. See Brannon, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
24. Opponents of direct legislation were able to get leirislative submission to the
voters in 1916 of a proposed amendment to the constitution providing that, in order
to become effective, initiated or referred measures must receive an affirmative vote
equal to "a majority of the total vote of the electors voting at said election," as distinguished from the existing requirement of merely a majority of the votes cast on
the particular measures. Publicity Pa-nphlet, 1916, pp. 3-4. That would have made
the initiative process virtually unworkable. Only five initiated measures . out of 31
which have been adopted, have ever received a majority of all votes cast at the elections
at which they have been approved, not one since 1916, when a prohibition amendment
was so adopted.
On the other hand, adoption in 1916 of the requirement of a majority of all votes
cast at an election could well have meant that no referendum measure would ever
have been saved from defeat. No referred measure has ever received a majority of all
votes cast at the election since 1912, when 3 measures were so approved.
This proposal was defeated by the very narrow margin of 18,961 to 18,356.
25. Two merit system laws, two measures extending and liberalizing the state's
unemployment compensation plan, one liberalizing old age aSsistance, and one liberaliz- ·
ing workmen's compensation as to occupational diseases.
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boycotts," restricting picketing, and authorizing injunctions
for enforcement. 26
·
It has been widely asserted that the potency of corporate
and conservative influences in Arizona's public affairs has
remained very well intact. The terms "special interests,"
"big interests," and "large taxpayers," have been used there
to include mining, railroad, banking, utility, and sometimes
large cattle and ranching interests, and it has been commonly said that perhaps they have never been more effectively integrated. Generally understood to operate in close
harmony with the leadership in what has been known as
the "_Ip.ajority" })_loc in ~he legislature, and with the so-called
Arizona Tax Research Association, this somewhat varying
alignment of interests has allegedly been able to exert a
powerful influence upon Arizona's traditional governmental
processes for many years. 27 Reputedly, it has also managed,
on occasion, to operate by means of, even in defiance of,
those special people's devices, the initiative and the
referendum.
By using the initiative process, the public employees of ,
Arizona secured adoption of a state retirement system for
26. · Publicity Pamphlet, 1952, pp. 24-26.
27. Speaking on personal privilege i.n a move to get his remarks recorded in the
Jou'T'rt<Ll of the Senate, near the end of the first regular session of the 21st Legislature,
on March 26, 1953, Senator James Smith, the unsuccessful "minority" candidate for
President of the Senate, was quoted "as saying in part that in the course of the session,
"I have been a member of the Independent and Minority group and have. had very
little to do with any major legislation which has passed this body-a thing for which
I am proud! I am also proud of my colleagues in this Independent group who have
had the courage to stand up on their hind legs and fight a system that has so completely throttled . . . the body t-olitic of this state that fair and ·equitable legislation
has become a lost art. . . .
"The governor could have had anything he wanted in legislation from this Senate,
so long as it did not cost the big interests of this state additional taxes . . . .
"Mr. President, . . . I am only attacking a system . . . a system that is bigger
than men, distorts legislatures, influences governors, and stymies equality in legislation.
It has no God except the almighty dollar, and all legislation is based on how many
dollars it will save the· system.
"This system . . . is a lobby of big interests. It operates to the disadvantage of
95 per cent of the citizens of this state.
"Fine men are elected to both branches of this legislature, but before they can
have even the slightest consideration in getting a bill out of the packed committees,
they must align themselves with the powers in control of that system . . . . " Text
published in the Arizona Statesman, April 2, 1953. See also Ariz<ma Republic, March
28, 1953, p. 8.

194

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

public employees, a relatively excellent plan, in 1948.28 The
law was approved by a decisive vote of 86,989 to 38,111. Yet
the "majority" leadership in the state legislature· persistently throughout three regular sessions and one c;ompetent
special session refused to permit voting of appropriations to
effectuate the plan. This refusal was in disregard of the law's
provision purportedly requiring the legislature to appropriate funds to operate the system, and in the face of the
fact that, by terms of the law, compulsory deductions from
state employees' earnings had started building a retirement
fund on July 1, 1949. This legislative defiance of a people's
enactment seems to have been a new development in the
country's experience with direct legislation. That and its
consequent developments seem, therefore, to call for careful
analysis in the interest of realistic understanding. 28 a
Finally, in 1952, the "majority" in the legislature passed
a measure repealing the Public Employees Retjrement Act
of 1948 and referring it to a vote of the people at the general
eleytion in November 1952. Then followed an observably
unequal campaign ·contest, conducted simultaneously with
the presidential and general state campaigns. It fell to the
state's eloquent and very popular Republican governor, 29
campaigning for election to a second term, to play a leading
part in the appeal to the voters to repeal their own previous
enactment, in a Republican landslide election. 30 The public
employees had almost no funds to use in making out a case
in favor of retention of the Retirement Act, as contrasted
28. Sections 12-801 to 12-823, Arizona Code Annotated, 1939. Cum. Supp.
28a. In the course of this long and unsuccessful struggle by the public employees
to get the Retirement Act of 1948 activated, they finally resorted to an effort to use
the initiative process in 1952 ( 1) to levy a severance tax on ores. and minerals in·
order to provide funds to operate the system, and (2) to appropriate money to pay
the costs of getting the plan into operation. One of the two 'costly suits which enjoined
the Secretary of State from putting these measures on the ballot was brought in the
names of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Mattice a'ltd
Langham v. Bolin, Case No. 73, 296, Maricopa County Superior Court, September 19,
1952.
29. The third Republican governor since statehood· in a traditionally Democratic
state. See N. D. Houghton, "The 1950 Elections in Arizona," ·Western Political Quarterl'JI, Vol. IV, p. 91 (March 1951).
·ao. See Paul Kelso, "The 1952 Elections in Arizona," Wesiern Political Quarterly,
Vol. VI, p. 100 (March 195.3).
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with what appeared to be ample expenditures on behalf of
the repeal effort. 31 The result was repeal by a vote of 128,094
to 48 1409-and a vivid illustration of the fact that the "popular will," as recorded by use of one of these people's devices,
may be successfully defied by a sufficiently determined and
powerful opposition, even with engineered approval of the
"popular will." 32
In the years following the adoption of the Arizona Constitution there came, in the natural course of events, legislative enactments to .effectuate the provisions for direct
legislation 33 and judicial interpretation of them. 34 The bulk
of these statutory enactments and court decisions, though
important, do
imperatively call for attention here; but
one recent decision of the ·Arizona Supreme Court has so_ ,
vitally affected the operation of the initiative and referendum in the state as to make mandatory some analysis of the
situation. It involves a series of developments with respect

not

Pl. The files of the newspapers of the state will reveal part of the contrast,
although. comparable radio evidence is not so readily re-examined, having largely
vanished with the sounds of the voices.
32. In the campaign, pledges were given that popular repeal of the unactivated
Retirement Act would be followed by action of the state: (1) to bring Arizona's public
employees bnder federal old age and survivors insurance coverage, and ( 2) to provide
an ''adequate supplementary retirement plan." Pursuant to this assurance, th~ neces. sary steps were taken to effectuate (1), and in 1953 the legislature passed a law in
the direction of (2). Spokesmen for the public employees were disappointed with the
law, however, considering it defecth;e in several important respects, and particularly
inadequate in its almost complete failure to make provision for the "prior service"
component so essential to launching a· plan for adequate retirement compensation.
33. Most of the effectuating legislation was enacted in 1912. See Arizona Sessicm
Laws, 1912, Chapters 70 and 71. Current citations are 60-101 to 60-115, Ch. 60, Art. I,
Arizona Code Annotated, 1939. S·'e also Arizona Session Laws, 1953, Chapters 57
and 82.
84. Leading cases: Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458; 130 Pac. 1114 ( 1913) ; Bullard 11.
Osborn, 16 Ariz. 247; 143 Pac. 117 ( 19l4) ; Clements v. Hall, 23 Ariz. 2; 201 Pac.
87 (1921) ; Willard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417; 428 Pac. 32 (1926); McBride v. Kirby,
32 Ariz. 515; 260 Pac. 435 ( 1927) ; State v. Pelosi, 68 Ariz. 51; 199 Pac. 2d. 765
(1948); Ward v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 271; 219 Pac. 2d 765 (1950); Warner
v. White, 39 Ariz. 203; 4 Pac. 2d 1000 ( 1931) ; Kirby v. Gri:f!in, 48 Ariz. 434; 62 Pac.
2d 1131 (1986) ; Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211; 125 Pac. 2d 445 (1942) ; Arizona v.
Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69; 131 Pac. 2d 983 (1942) ; Hernandez 11. Frohmiller, 68
Ariz. 242; 204 Pac. 2d 854 (1949); Dennis v. Jordon, 71 Ariz. 430; 229 Pac. 2d 692
(1951) ; Eide v. FrohmiUer, 70 Ariz. 128; 216 Pac. 2d 726 (1950); Adams v. Bolin,
74 Ariz. 269; 247 Pac. 2d 617 (1952); Estes v. ·state, 48 Ariz.·21; 58 Pac. 2d 753
(1936) ; Tucson· Manor, Inc. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., 73 Ariz. 387; 241
Pac. 2d 1126 ( 1952).
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to whether and under what conditions measures once
adopted by the voters shall be subject to subsequent alteration or repeal by the legislature.
Examination of the provisions for direct legislation in
the various states having those devices discloses some variety of policy in this regard. In some states, measures
adopted by direct legislative processes are entirely immune
from any subsequent legislative disturbance. 35 In other
states, such enactments are immune from legislative repeal
or amendment for some specified period of time-two years
in Washington. It is the peculiar wording of the Arizona
Constitution which has permitted recent confusion there.
It has also been common practice to exempt measures
adopted by vote of the people from veto by the governor, in
terms making the exemption applicable to "measures re-,
ferred to the people" or to "initiative or referendum measures." And again, it is the peculiar wording of the Arizona
Constitution which has led to confusion there.
Let it be recalled at this point that the outstanding issue
in the election of delegates to the Arizona Constitutional
Convention in 1910 and also in the deliberations of the convention was on the initiative, referendum, and recall.
Research on the work of the convention does not reveal
whether the confusing provision, to which reference has
been made immediately above, was simply inadvertently so
worded, or whether possibly it could have been done by deliberate design of opponents of the whole idea of direct
legislation. Records show that the Oregon provision for
direct legislation was the major pattern by which the
Arizona Convention was guided; yet for some reason the
wording in this unfortunate instance did not follow the comparable Oregon provision.
The Arizona Constitution provides that
any measure or amendment to the constitution proposed under
the Initiative, and any measure to which· the Referendum is
applied, shall be referred to the qualified electors, and shall
35.

See, for example, the Constitution of California, Art. IV, sec. 1.
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become law when approved by a majority of the votes cast
thereon . .. ,36

Then, as originally adopted, the Constitution provided
that
The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to Initiative
or Referendum measures approved by a majority of the qualified electors.37

Thus, ~s originally adopted, the legislature. was left entirely
free to repeal or amend statutory· measures approved by a
vote of the people and, although there is indication that the
. convention originally deliberately refrained from denying
this power to the legislature, search fails to reveal any convention awareness or intent that measures approved at the
polls by a "majority of the votes cast thereon," as provided
by paragraph 5, were in any way distinguishable from measures approved. by a "majority of the qualified electors," as the
wording was put in paragraph 6. The original intent appears
simply to have beeh: (1) that measures should become effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon,
and; (2) that all measures so approved should be exempt
from executive veto, but subject to legislative repeal or
alteration.
Then, for reasons shortly to be stated, the enthusiastic
proponents of direct legislation sponsored and secured adoption in 1914 of an amendment to paragraph 6 designed to
immunize all measures adopted by these devices from subsequent legislative repeal or alteration. Thereafter, paragraph
6 read:
The veto power of the Governor, .or the power of the legislature to repeal or amend,38 shall not extend to initiative or
referendum measures approved by a majority vote of the
qualified electors.

There is an obvious discrepancy between the wording
of paragraph 5, a "majority of the votes cast thereon," and
36.
37.
38.

Art. IV, Part I, sec. 1, paragraph 5. Italics supplied.
Art. IV, Part I, sec. 1, paragraph 6. Italics supplied.
Italics supplied to show the words added by the 1914 amendment.
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paragraph 6, a "majority of the qualified electors," which
was pointed out by the first comprehensive study made of
the initiative and referendum in Arizona, back in 1931.39
Again, however, careful search fails to reveal any evidence
prior to 1952, that there ever was any official or legal assertion or assumption of doubt that the two were intended to
mean precisely the same thing, namely, approved by the
voters. But in the spring of 1952, alert and ingenious counsel, working not only to prevent legislative effectuation of
the Public Employees Retirement Act of 1948, but also to
nullify that law, argued effectively before the State Su- .
preme Court that the two expressions should be interpreted
absolutely literally. The result was that the court, by a
division of 4 to 1, held that a "majority of the qualified
electors" means a major~ty of all' registered voters of the
state; and the effect was to make all statutory measures
approved by a "majority of the votes cast thereon" subject
to subsequent alteration or repeal by the legislature, 40 unless
approved by a "majority vote of the qualified electors (registered voters)" of the state. 41
The potential significance of this decision becomes apparent in light of the fact that no single measure has ever
been approved by a majority of the registered voters of the
state; and there appears to be no real prospect that any
measure ever will receive that number of votes, so as to be
immune from legislative repeal. The significance is equally
impressive, on the one hand with ardent proponents of direct
legislation, as devices for getting results by popular action,
in spite of the legislature, and on the other hand, with those
who feel more comfortable with a restoration of essentially ·
39. See Todd, op. cit., p. 37. In this st~dy, made in 1931, long after paragraph
6 had been amended to bar also legislative alteration or repeal of such measures, Mr.
Todd pointed out that "under a strict construction of this. phrase, the governor,
apparently, could veto, or the legislature could act upon a measure approved hy a
majority of those voting upon that particular question, should. that number be less
than a majority of the 'qualified electors.' Although it is not established that this
loophole was deliberately placed in the Constitution, and no court construction has
been made thereupon, the situation seems to leave a possibility of the above-mentioned
action on the. part of the governor or the legislature.''
40. And also subject to veto by the governor.
41. Adams"· Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269; 247 Pac. 2d 617 (1952).
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the old territorial situation, in which groups able to control
the legislature need have perh'aps not too much fear of effective popular defiance of their will.
We have had occasion earlier to refer to the fact that ·at
the first session of the Arizona legislature after statehood,
organized labor was able to secure enactment by the legislature of a number of laws, in spite of the traditional opposition of railroad and mining interests. The opposition immediately had recourse to the referendum in an unsuccessful
effort to nullify several of· these enactments. In the course
of the campaign, however, and in the next session of the
legislature there was some apparently serious threat that
the legishiture ·might undertake to repeal some of these
laws. 42
This early experience led to the proposal in 1914 of the
constitutional amendment by the initiative process, sponsored by the Arizona Federation of Labor, designed to prevent the legislature from altering or repealing any measure
once adopted by popular vote. The form of the proposal was
to add a minimum of essential words to paragraph 6, so as
.to bar both veto by the governor and alteration by the legislature of all "initiative or referendum measures approved
,by a majority vote of the qualified electors." 43 Thus, due to
an economy in the use of words, not commonly attributed
to lawyers in the popular mind, the framers of this amendment allowed the language to stand so as to invite argument
for literal interpretation of it by some attorney of a later
generation, who 'vas not there, Charlie,' when the general
understanding of intent and purpose originated among lawyers of the state contemporary to the wording of the
language.
As an indication of the intent and purpose of the sponsors of the 1914 amendment, their argument published in
the Publicity Pamphlet of 1914 declared:
42. Particularly, a law fixing maximum railroad passenger rates and another
requiring. private employers to pay workers twice a month. See Publicity Pamphlet,
1914, pp. 41-42.
43. Publicity Pamphlet, 1914, pp. 39-42.
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We wish to impress upon. the voters of the State the importance of the amendment to the State Constitution whereby
the Legislature will not be allowed to repeal or amend any
initiative or referendum measure passed by the people.44

As an indication that the active opponents of the 1914
amendment also understood its intent and purpose precisely
as its sponsors did, their opposing argument published in the
Publicity Pamphlet stated specifically that:
The Constitution already prohibits the governor from vetoing
any law adopted by the people, so the amendment merely pertains to [alterations or repeal of such measures by] the
legislature. 45

The main argument of the opposition was simply that the
amendment should be defeated because the legislature ought
to have power to "correct mistakes" in popularly enacted
laws; and they certainly accepted the sponsors' interpretation that, if adopted, this amen'dment would effectively
deprive the legislature of its power to alter or repeal any
law "passed by the people." 46 As previously stated, the
amendment was adopted ; and, so far as can be ascertained,
no judge, legislator, governor, or attorney ever questioned
the accepted proposition that its intended effect had been
accomplished, until the summer of 1952. 47
In explanation of the wording of the 1914 amendment, a
prominent member of the Convention of 1910, continuous
and forceful advocate of direct legislation, and one of the
state's most highly respected attorneys, states that:
44. Statement signed by Bert Davis, President of the Arizona Federation of
Labor. Italics supplied.
45. Italics supplied.
46. Publicity Pamphlet, 1914, pp. 41, 42.
47. The most serious previous frontal attack made upon the workability of the initiative and referendum had come in 1916, immediately following the amendment of 1914,
while the original sponsors and opponents of direct legislation were still rather clearly
and identifiably squared off against each other. Since the 1914 amendment was universally accepted as having removed laws enact~d by popular vote from subsequent
leg'slative alteration or repeal, those elements in the state who were unhappy about
the situation were able to secure legislative proposal of an amendment to the constitution designed to make it decidedly more difficult to enact measures by popular vote.
See footnote 24.
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The form of the [original] paragraph was left, as is the usual
practice in preparing legal amendments, to follow the original
form except as to the addition of such words as might be
necessary to effect the desired purpose, and the only change
desired in this instance was to supplement the denial of power
to the Governor to veto with the denial of the power to the
legislature to repeal or amend an initiative or referendum
measure approved by the people. It did not occur to the proposers of the amendment in 1914, as in thirty-six years following, it did not occur to any Governor, any legislator, or any
citizen, that the form of the paragraph limited it~ effectiveness to measures approved by a majority of all eligible voters,
whether voting or not.

This appears to be a fair statement of the matter. In
fact, the Arizona Supreme Court in several cases, over the
period from 1926 to 1950, took occasion to affirm the general
understanding that, after 1914, all measures adopted by
popularvote were immune from subsequent repeal or alteration by the legislature.
In 1926, the court said that, "no measure approved
by a referendum could be repealed or amended by the
legislature." 48
In 1927, the court declared that, "paragraph (6) expressly deprives the legislature of the right to enact measures affecting . . . initiated or referred measures approved
by the voters." 49
In 1942, the court had occasion to say that, "there is one
difference between an initiated and legislative law. While a
legislative act may be repealed by a subsequent legislature,
an initiated measure, once adopted, can only be repealed in
the same manner in which it was adopted." 5°
In 1948, the court, referring to certain sections of the
statutes, said they, "were enacted by the Legislature andreferred to and approved by the people, and having been
approved by the people, the Legislature is without power
to repeal or amend these me~sures." 51
•
48.
49.
50.
51.

Willard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417 ; 248 Pac. 32 ( 1926).
McBride v. Kerby, 32 Ariz. 515 ; 260 Pac. 435 (1927).
Arizona v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69 ; 131 Pac. '2d 983 ( 1942).
State v. Pewsi, 68 Ariz. 51; 199 Pac: 2d 125 ( 1948).
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And as late as 1950 the court recognized the "constitutional immunity [of initiative and referendum measures]
from amendment by the Legislature." 5 2
When' the legislative majority in 1952, refusing again
to effectuate the Public Employees Retirement Act of 1948,
passed a bill purporting to repeal that law, but referring
it to a vote of the people, the public employees with support
from Mr. William R. Mathews, Editor and Publisher of the
Arizona Daily Star, sought an injunction to prevent the
Secretary of State from putting the measure on the ballot
on the ground that "the Legislature was without· power to
refer the measure" to a vote of the people. 53 The Superior
Court having refused to grant the injunction, the case was
appealed to the State Supreme Court, which not only affirmed the propriety of the Legislature's action to refer the
law to the people for a "second look," as it was semiofficially
designated, 54 but it also held that the Legislature has power
to amend or repeal, on its own authority, any statutory
measure which has been enacted by the people unless it has
been approved by a "majority vote of the qualified [registered] electors" of the state. 55
To counsel's reliance upon the apparently universal official and legal acceptance of the proposition that the intent
and purpose of the amendment of 1914 had been to place
all measures adopted by vote of the people beyond the power
of the legislature to repeal or amend, buttressed as it had
been by repeated acceptance of it by the State Supreme
Court, the Court in 1952 simply replied: (1) that "where
52. Ward v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 271; 219 Pac. 2d 765 (1950).
53. Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269; 247 Pac. 2d 617 (1952).
54. On three previous occasions the legislature had referred to the voters measures
to repeal the same identical law (a game control law) which had originally been
enacted by the initiative process in .1916. The people rejected the repeal in 1921 (See
Arizona Session Laws, 1923, p'. 444) and again in 1926 (See Arizona Session Laws,
1925, Chap. 6). On the third try, the people approved' the repeal in 1928 (See Chap. 3,
Acts of the Special Session of the Eighth Legislature, Session Laws, 1928). It appears,
however, that the courts had had no previous occasion to adjudicate the propriety of
this legislative action; but the experience seems to show that the legislature had never
considered that it had power to repeal outright any measure previously enacted or
approved by th~ people by a "majority of the votes cast thereon."
55. Willard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417; 248 Pac. 32 ( 1926).
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there is involved no ambiguity or absurdity, a statutory
or constitutional provision requires no interpretation";
(2) that in no previous case had the meaning of the pertinent language of the Arizona Constitution ever been questioned by litigants; (3) that in one of the cases cited it had
not been necessary for the court to make the statement
recognizing immunity of all popularly enacted laws from
legislative power to repeal; and ( 4) that in any event all
such previous holdings of the court were now specifically
overruled, in so far as they may have applied to measures
e approved by less than a "majority vote of the qualified (registered) electors" of the state. 56
Said -the Court :
None of these [previous] cases presented the direct question
as to whether there is a vital distinction between an initiated
or referred measure enacted or approved by a majority of the
qualified (registered) electors and measures enacted or approved merely by a majority of the votes cast thereon.51 The
instant case for the first time asserts that there is such distinction and makes an issue of it.

The Court readily saw the distinction, and being unimpressed by a showing of original and long accepted understanding that the two expressions were identical in intent
and purpose, the Court, admitting that "we are on our own
in attempting to construe the words 'approved by a majority
vote of the qualified electors,' " for lack of any reference to
any case in which the expression had ever been judicially
construed, nevertheless reached the
conclusion that the words mean simply what they say. . . .
To enforce it according to its terms [said the opinion], will
mean that only those initiated and referred measures which
receive the majority vote of the qualified [registered] electors
will be immune from legislative amendment or repeal.

Counsel for plaintiffs argued vainly, but apparently
unanswerably, that the court was being asked to adopt an
interpretation which would be both administratively and ju56.
67.

Adams"· Bolin. 74 Ariz. 269; 247 Pac. 2d 617 (1952).
Italics supplied.
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dicially unworkable. They ·p()inted out that, as a matter of
practical application, it is simply not administratively
feasible to know or to determine for any election how many
"qualified electors" there are in the state. Registration,
which the court accepted and designated as the test for voter
qualification, is as a matter of fact not an adequate test.
Even, assuming the legality of registration, as of the date of
enrollment for each registered voter, registration lists become notoriously and progressively inaccurate, due to deaths,
and removals from precincts and counties, and even from
the state. A sizeable proportion of registered persons are, '
therefore, not "qualified electors," and the only way really
to know how many "qualified electors" there are in the state
at any given election time would be actually t9 check every
registration, in order to verify its validity, a process which
is simply not practicable. If_ any case should ever develop
inviting or calling for court determination of whether any ·
measure has been adopted by a "majority of the qualified
electors," only a litigant with ample funds to pay for the
very expensive checking services, could possibly offer the
courts even allegedly accurate data on which a sound decision might be based; and only a group with equally ample
funds could offer any effective rebuttal.
The majority opinion is one which perhaps many lawyers
might call "well reasoned," or what perhaps Professor Rodell
. of Yale Law School might call "well rationalized.'-' 58 It pur.:.
ports to put the court in a position of really having no choice
but to rule as it did. In fact, if one may take a bit of liberty
with a bit of Hamlet, it may appear to some that the judge
who wrote the opinion in Adams v. Bolin, "doth protest too
much," with approval of three of his brethren, to the
moralistic effect that the state's legislative future must
necessarily be in safer hands because of this decision.
Saith the Court:
We are of the opinion that to permit the legislature to make
needed amendments to ill-considered initiated laws or referred
measures that, through the passage of time, have become obso58.

Fred Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyers, Ch. 8, esp. p. 193.
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lete, will be a step forward and relieve the people of shackling
legislation.

Continuing, the opinion stated that measures enacted
by popular vote
do not have the advantage of open debate and analysis, and
oftentimes incorporate provisions that are, out of harmony
with and contradict the general scheme of legislation.

Aside from the fact that no examples were cited of such
"oftentimes"-enacted poorly conceived laws by popular vote
in the state, the court seemed to overlook the fact that all
measures referred by referendum petition will have had a~l
the alleged "advantage of open debate and analysis'' when
enacted by the legislature.
As further indication that some of the judges may possibly have had their own individual intolerances for the
processes of direct legislation, on principle, 59 the opinion
referred to the fact that some Arizona laws approved by
popular vote in the early years of statehood, when the population was far less than in the 1950's, had received relatively
small numbers of votes.
In order, [said the court] to propose [by the initiative] an
amendment or repeal of ari initiated or referred law at the
present time [prior to Adams v. Bolin], for the most part,
requires one and one-half times as many signatures as the
measure received when ~t was enacted or approved, a most
59. One of the judges who concurred in Adams v. Bolin had taken occasion frankly
to express his lack of confidence in the initiative process in a recent previous case, in
which he dissented. Said he: "I recognize that the Constitution reserves to the people
of the state the right to initiate and pass legislation . . • and it may be that, upon
the ground of public policy, 'it is entitled to be shielded by the same protective armor
of legal presumptions that surround an act of the legislature. Public policy, however,
is the only theory in my opinion upon which such presumption could possibly rest. I
say this for the reason that it is common knowledge that voters, for the most part,
have no knowledge whatever of the contents of initiative measures, therefore the Ian ...
guage used therein cannot be said to express their legislative intent. Under such
circumstances it is very doubtful in my mind if public policy should be allowed to
prevail in establishing a legislative intent in initiative measures when the facts all
contradict that presumption." Dennis v. Jordon, 71 Ariz. 430; 229 Pac. 2d 692, 707.
( 1951) in which the Court, 4 to 1, upheld the constitutionality of the Public Employees
Retirement Act of 1948 against a battery of attacks.

- '

206

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

expensive and laborious undertaking; so mu,ch so, in fact, that
many of them die a-borning.6o
'

Then, putting a sort of cap sheaf upon this moral line
of justification for its presumably judicially unavoidable
ruling, the opinion went on to say that,
To, give the legislature the outright power to amend or repeal,
both subject to the referendum, can only result in good; not
'good' that we, as members of the court view it, but the opportunity for 'good' as envisioned and authorized by the Constitution. And if the people think that any legislative repeal or
amendment of initiated hnv is not desirable, five per centum
of the qualified electors can force a referendum against it
and the people will again have an opportunity to express their
opinion thereon.
-

The court may have spoken more truly than it realized
when it referred to the "expensive and laborious undertaking" involved in making use of the processes of direct lawmaking. In fact, that use is so "laborious and expensive"
as to make it impractical for the same group of the common
"people" to utilize them over and over, in order to accomplish and maintain results, as against allegedly entrenched
power in the legislature, and in the face of demonstrated
financial disadvantage of "the people" in the conduct of
popular campaigns. Experience in this respect particularly
has shown that the sponsors of direct legislation forty years
ago had some reason to seek to put popularly enacted measures beyond the power of the legislature freely to annul
them.
It is submitted here that the matter. ought not to be
allowed to rest as it was left by Adams v. Bolin. It should
be possible to work out a proper repair job by way of a
constitutional amendment. There has always been recognized
merit in thE! proposition that it is unwise, on principle, to
give ordinary statutory law a status of constitutional law,
whether by writing it into a constitution or by placing popularly enacted measures beyond all reach of necessary legislative alteration. Yet legislative alteration of such measures
60.

Italics supplied.
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'should not be so easy as to invite legislative sabotage of
hard-won ("laborious and expensive") popularly-approved
reforms. There may be no way to give effective voice in state
policymaking to minority groups with modest financial assets comparable to the influence of other closely integrated
minority groups. But in a democracy the underlying assumption is that an effort must be made to do just that.
It is suggested, substantially in accord with a proposal
introduced in the first regular session of the 21st legislature
in 1953,61 ·that the Arizona Constitution might well be
amended so as to permit legislative alteration of popularly
enacted statutory measures under presumably adequate restrictions. Perhaps all such enactments could well be given a
trial run of some minimum period of say six years; during
which they would be completely immune from all legislative
action directed toward their repeal or alteration. Then, after
expiration of this period, they might with some reason become subject to legislative alteration by a vote of two-thirds
or three-fourths of the members of each house, 62 subject,
however, to use of the referendum; and in the event of popular rejection' of such legislative alteration, then it might
seem reasonable to make the measure immune from further
legislative molestation for an extended period of years.
At the regular session in 1953, immediately following
the long controversy about the activation of the Public Employees Retirement Act of 1948 and Adams v. Bolin, the
legislature passed an act, "introduced by the Committee on
Suffrage and Elections," purporting to revamp the law
prescribing the operating details for direct legislation. In
an introductory section· entitled "Declaration of purpose,"
it is set forth in pa~t that
In recent years small pressure groups, taki:qg advantage of
the substantial increase in the size of the electorate and the
61. House Concurrent Resolution, No. 4.
62. There is already some basis in the Constitution 'for suggesting either of these
extraordinary majority votes. Legislative enactments may be made immune from the
referendum by a two-thirds vote of the elected members of both houses. And such
uemergency" measures, if vetoed by the governor, may be passed over the veto only
by a vote of three-fourths of the members of each house. Art. IV, Part I, par. 3.
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resultant great numbers of uninformed signers of initiative
and referendum petitions, have attempted, through fraudulent
and corrupt practices in connection with the circulation of
petitions, to appropriate this fundamental right of the people
to their own selfish purposes. These abuses have tended to
bring the initiative and referendum processes into disrepute.
It is the sense of this legislature that in order to prevent
the recurrence of such abuses . . . legislation should be enacted further implementing the provisions of the constitution
governing the exercise of this right.

Careful examination of the new law fails to reveal anything which would appear to offer any additional safeguard
against alleged "fraudulent and corrupt practices" or
"abuses," though perhaps it may make the process of securing valid signatures somewhat more difficult. The new and
really significant feature introduced here is a provision for
a system by which well-financed groups, opposed to submission of any particular measures to vote of the people, may
undertake to induce wholesale withdrawals of signatures
within 60 days, after petitions have been filed.
This plan provides for withdrawals by means of individual affidavits to be executed by signers of previously filed
petitions. The process, being necessarily expensive and inconvenient, could hardly conceivably be used, spontaneously
and individually, by any appreciable number of persons.
But, under the pressure of an organized, publicized, and
possibly prepaid movement, enough withdrawals may very
well be induced either (1) to invalidate the petitions or
(2) to provide a basis for expensive litigation in court. In
any event, only well financed interests could either (1) utilize the device effectively to prevent submission of measures
whose submission they oppose, or (2) survive its use against
measures which they may wish to sponsor. 63

a

63. Arizona Session LrLws, 1953, Chapter 82 (House Bill No. 167). In the interest
of realistic evaluation and clarity of understanding, it should be made clear that this
legislative allegation of "fraudulent and corrupt Practices" and "abuses,. in the circulation of direct legislation petitions appears to be a misleading one. That is· not to say
that in the course of forty years there have never been any irregularities or improprieties in these processes; but any implication that they have been more prevalent in
this field than in other aspects of the state's political and governmental processes
seems unwarranted.

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM .

209

It appears that irreconcilable opponents of the processes
of direct legislation in the state may not be satisfied even
with the new situation which permits the legislature to alter
or repeal measures so enacted. 64 There ·are persistent reports
that it is proposed again to sponsor an amendment to the
constitution providing that measures of direct legislation
shall become effective only if approved by a majority of the
voters voting at the election at which they are submitted.
That could make it virtually impossible ever to secure the
enactment of any such measure. 65
64. Unsuccessful efforts were made at the regular session of the legislature in
1953 to get consideration of a proposal to •bar legislative alteration or repeal of popularly enacted measures. House Concurrent Resolution, Nos. 3 arid 5.
65. See footnote 24 for a similar effort in ln6.

